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Recent trends in both Britain and continental Europe have made the question of the 
United Kingdom’s position as a fully fledged member of the EU more contentious 
than it has been for decades.  The almost unchecked rise of Euroscepticism amongst 
both the British political elite – especially within the governing Conservative Party – 
and the media, means that the possibility of British withdrawal from the Union, or at 
very least the renegotiation of its position within it, is discussed more openly and in 
more mainstream political circles than at any time since the 1970s.  On the other side 
of the Channel meanwhile, the perceived need to address the weaknesses of the single 
currency by increasing integration, whether across the EU as a whole or simply those 
countries that share the Euro, has helped create a situation in which many of the key 
decisions are taken in fora within which the British are either not represented at all, or 
are marginal players at best.  Few European governments openly aspire to a situation 
in which the United Kingdom moves away from the core European decision making 
system, and several have publicly deplored the possibility.  But faced with the need to 
press ahead, and the ever decreasing likelihood of the British being able to follow any 
such advance, European governments are being forced to contemplate the prospect of 
a core Europe without Britain. 
 In such circumstances it seems particularly appropriate that the publication of 
Sir Stephen Wall’s volume of The Official History of Britain and the European 
Community allows us to revisit an earlier period, that between 1963 and 1975, when 
Britain’s relationship with the then fledgling European Communities was in a state of 
profound uncertainty.  The new volume, the sequel to Alan Milward’s first volume of 
the Official History covering the years from 1945 to 1962, takes a detailed look at the 
failure of Britain’s first attempt to accede to the EC in 1963, the second Labour-led 
application of 1967 which like its predecessor was thwarted by a veto from General 
de Gaulle, the revival of Britain’s second application once de Gaulle had left power, 
the membership negotiations of 1970-1, the struggle to secure parliamentary 
ratification of the European Communities bill, Britain’s first year in the European 
Community and the Labour-inspired renegotiation of British membership in 1974, 
before ending with the 1975 referendum on British membership which resulted in a 
seemingly decisive popular vote in favour of remaining within the EC.  The nature of 
both Britain and the Community in the 1963 to 1975 period was, needless to say, very 
different from today. So too was the tone of the debate on both sides of the Channel. 
The underlying questions however of what membership or exclusion from an 
integrating Europe would mean for Britain’s wider role in the world, or what the 
British could contribute, for good or for ill, to the integration process itself and to 
Europe’s future still have a degree of resonance in the current situation.  This is 
contemporary history, in other words, whose relevance and interest for those 
primarily engaged with the present day is almost beyond dispute. 
 The story recounted in Wall’s volume is both eventful and complex.  The book 
opens where Milward’s account left off in late 1962, with Harold Macmillan’s 
government in the midst of a complex membership negotiation with the six member 
states of the EEC. Straight away however one of the key differences between Wall’s 
approach and that of his predecessor becomes apparent.  For while Milward, whose 
background was that of an economic historian, remained fascinated in the substance 
of the membership negotiations and was ready, indeed, to turn the economic questions 
that the UK’s interaction with Europe raised about Britain’s place in the world into 
the leitmotiv of his whole volume, Wall is much more inclined to focus primarily on 
the high politics of the Britain and Europe story.  The central characters of this 
account are thus Macmillan, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath on the British side, 
and Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and to a lesser extent Willy Brandt on that 
of the Community, rather than those who actually conducted the multiple membership 
negotiations, and of the issues at stake, political and geo-political calculations often 
outweigh economic assessments of what might be gained or lost through British 
membership of the EEC. Great men dominate this history (and in the pre-Thatcher era 
they were all men) rather than the interplay of structural forces favoured by Wall’s 
predecessor. 
 As a result the key episodes in the first of Wall’s nine chapters are 
Macmillan’s failed attempt at Rambouillet in December 1962 to persuade de Gaulle 
that Britain belonged inside the European Community, the summit between John F. 
Kennedy and Macmillan at Nassau in the Bahamas that immediately followed the 
Rambouillet meeting, and de Gaulle’s famous – or infamous – press conference of 
January 14, 1963 in which he rejected British membership.  The idea that the nuclear 
deal struck between the British Prime Minister and the US President at Nassau in 
some way provoked the veto – as some retrospective comments by French ministers 
appeared to suggest – is rejected, rightly in my view.  The causes of the veto are 
instead seen as lying in de Gaulle’s strong sense that the inclusion of Britain in the 
Community as it existed would make it less advantageous for France, economically 
and politically, and less easy for Paris to dominate.  The actual negotiations in 
Brussels, the last ditch attempt by the British to rally the ‘friendly Five’ member 
states to their cause, and the multiple efforts by Macmillan and others to persuade the 
French leader that Britain was becoming more European and as such better suited to 
the Community were all of little consequence in the face of de Gaulle’s implacable 
opposition. 
 This sense of Britain’s European vocation having been thwarted by an 
immovable French barrier sets the scene for chapter 2.  Entitled ‘picking up the 
pieces’ this looks at the aftermath of the Brussels breakdown, reviews the domestic 
political consequences devoting some space to the position of Harold Wilson, the new 
leader of the Opposition, and looks at the somewhat ineffective diplomatic 
manoeuvring as the British and their allies amongst the Five sought to salvage 
something from the wreckage. Wall also outlines a little known disagreement between 
Macmillan and Heath, when the latter who had served as chief negotiator in the 
abortive 1961-63 membership bid and as such felt particularly ill-used by de Gaulle, 
helped quash the Prime Minister’s brief flirtation with the idea of Anglo-French 
military cooperation.  This clash between a strategy based on wooing the French and 
one that instead sought to pressurise the French into giving way by emphasising 
Britain’s links with the Five foreshadows, as Wall perceptively points out, the much 
better known ‘Soames Affair’ of 1969. 
 The problem with both this chapter and that which follows, though, is that not 
a great deal happens.  The book’s basic technique is to allow its course to be dictated 
by events and to provide detailed summaries of both key meetings, and important 
documents.  Wall has an eye for a good quote and plenty of experience in extracting 
the essentials from a diplomatic conversation or meeting.  He is therefore able to 
assemble quite a rich mix of narrative description, but chooses not to comment on it 
extensively or to impose his own analytical structure. This method works effectively 
when, as in the first chapter, plot developments come thick and fast.  But it is less well 
suited for those intermediate periods between the main events, where British policy 
tended to drift.  As a result, neither the chapter covering Conservative policy after the 
failure of the first membership bid, nor that devoted to Labour’s initial uncertainty 
about the appropriate European course really grip.  The out-and-out specialist will 
find useful details.  I enjoyed for instance the account of Wilson’s first encounter with 
de Gaulle.  But the more general reader may find it hard to stay the course. 
 The narrative picks up pace again in the two chapters devoted to Harold 
Wilson’s membership bid.  As he acknowledges in his introduction, Wall is clearly 
fascinated by the Labour Prime Minister, discerning in him a degree of commitment 
to British EC membership that many others have overlooked.  ‘Wilson, once 
persuaded of the advantages of membership (and the absence of viable alternatives), 
held to that view both in Government and in Opposition.’ (p.2) Wall also makes good 
use of his additional sources in this section, since while the official minutes of the 
Cabinet discussions that preceded Labour’s 1967 application have been open for some 
time at the National Archives, Wall, as official historian, is also allowed to see the 
Cabinet Secretary’s notes upon which the official minutes are based.  Quite a lot of 
extra detail can be added as a result – detail which only highlights the adept way in 
which the Prime Minister piloted his fractious ministers towards the decision that he 
sought.  Once more the emphasis in this explanation of why Wilson too decided to 
turn to Europe is on the political rather than the economic.  The Labour Prime 
Minister seems never to have regarded the economic case for membership as wholly 
convincing since the possible long term merits of additional competition and trade, 
were largely balanced out by the negative short term impact on Britain’s fragile 
balance-of-payments position and the failings, from a UK point of view, of the 
Community’s costly and protectionist agricultural policy.  But what did make the 
difference were the political dangers of marginalisation were Britain to stand aside 
from an integrating Europe.  A Britain within ‘Europe’ could aspire not only to 
become leading members of European grouping – one of the sub-texts running 
throughout this book is the way in which all of the governments covered based their 
calculations on the assumption that once within the EC Britain would quickly 
establish itself as a strong leader, if not the leader of the integration process – but 
would also be able to use their new position to revitalise links with the United States 
and with the Commonwealth that were otherwise likely to fade.  Remaining outside – 
or ‘going it alone’ as it was described in government circles – by contrast, carried 
with it the strong danger that Britain would soon find itself nothing more than ‘a 
greater Sweden’, largely excluded from the key political and global decisions of the 
day, and forced instead to watch as Western policy was determined through dialogue 
between the United States and an ever more French and/or German-dominated 
Europe.  It was primarily for this reason that Harold Wilson, and his foreign 
secretaries George Brown and Michael Stewart, became convinced that Britain had to 
become a member of the EEC. 
 Convincing a divided Labour party of this decision was difficult enough; 
winning round the French was more demanding still.  Chapter 5 thus describes in 
some detail the multiple tactics by which Wilson tried to circumvent the barrier of de 
Gaulle.  Direct diplomacy was one option: Wilson like Macmillan before him 
travelled to Paris in an attempt to persuade the French leader that British membership 
would strengthen the Community rather than weaken it, and would prove 
advantageous to France.  Wilson’s outline of how Britain could help create a 
‘technological Community’ was for instance intended to win round the French. 
Another possibility was to persuade France’s Community partners to place sufficient 
pressure on the General to force him to change his mind.  And yet a third was to hope 
that by beginning a process of debate and discussion on Community enlargement, if 
necessary in fora other than the Community itself like the Western European Union, 
such a degree of momentum would be established that it would become impossible 
for France to bar Britain’s path.  But it was all to no avail.  In two press conferences 
first in May, and then more decisively in November 1967, de Gaulle once more made 
clear that Britain was not yet ready for membership, nor the Community yet ready for 
enlargement.  Instead the United Kingdom should seek some form of association with 
the EEC.  British hopes had again been thwarted by seemingly immovable opposition 
from Paris. 
 The failure of the 1967 application was followed by another period in which 
neither British policy, nor Wall’s description of it, had much sense of direction.  
Association was impossible, not just because it had been suggested by de Gaulle, but 
more importantly because it would subject Britain to some of the short term economic 
disruption that a commercial realignment with Europe would entail, without providing 
the British with any voice in Brussels and hence any of the political dividends to 
which Wilson had become so attached.  Nor were any of the alternatives to 
membership – going it alone, or exploring the possibility of a commercial tie up with 
the United States – that had been rejected in the spring of 1967 any more attractive or 
realistic one year on.  Instead, all that London could do was to maintain its course, 
ensure that the Five went on calling for enlargement in Brussels, and wait until the 
obstacle in the Elysée was removed from Britain’s path.  There was admittedly a brief 
moment in early 1969 when it looked as if de Gaulle might have changed his mind 
about British membership, telling Sir Christopher Soames, the new British 
ambassador in Paris, that France and Britain should hold secret bilateral discussions 
about the way forward – a way which he implied might well lead to something rather 
different from the existing European structures.  But internal divisions within London, 
with some eager to explore this potential opening and others fearing a cunning trap, 
led to this opportunity – if that indeed was what it was – being wasted.  Rather than 
the start of an Anglo-French rapprochement, the Soames affair became another bitter 
London-Paris spat.  
 In April 1969, however, General de Gaulle did resign.  His successor, Georges 
Pompidou, while a Gaullist, was on record, moreover, as having spoken more 
favourably of British membership than the General had ever done.  And in December 
1969, the Six held a summit in The Hague where they agreed to press ahead with the 
‘completion’, the ‘deepening’ and the ‘widening’ of the European Community.  
Britain’s chances of being able to join seemed immeasurably improved. Chapter 7 can 
thus describe the start of membership negotiations, culminating in the set-piece 
encounter in May 1971 between Pompidou and Edward Heath.  Again Wall decides to 
opt for a primarily high political account. Those wanting details of the various issues 
from agriculture to Commonwealth trade, from fishing limits to Britain’s budgetary 
contribution, around which the Brussels talks revolved would do well to turn to the 
published Whitehall history of the negotiations themselves written up by the leader of 
the UK delegation, Sir Con O’Neill.  Instead, the focus here is on Heath’s contacts 
with his counterparts amongst the Six and especially the meticulous preparation that 
went into the May 1971 summit.  This bore fruit.  When the two leaders met in Paris, 
Heath was able to impress his European vision upon the French leader – something 
which both Macmillan and Wilson had sought in vain to do with de Gaulle – and, 
crucially, persuade Pompidou to engage in a substantive discussion of some of the 
issues holding back advance in Brussels.  The success of the summit thus went 
beyond establishing a good personal rapport between the British and French leaders 
and signalling the start of a new period of entente cordiale; it also caused the 
instructions to French negotiators in Brussels to be altered, thereby clearing the way 
for a rapid advance through most of the outstanding dossiers.  Success in Paris 
quickly translated into success in Brussels. 
 Were the membership terms eventually agreed upon good or bad?  The title of 
chapter 8 seems to promise an assessment.  Once more, however, Wall prefers to 
report the views of others more than advance his own.  We are thus told about 
Commonwealth reactions, about views within the government, and crucially about the 
way in which the mood in the Labour party had hardened against the negotiating 
outcome, leading the majority of the party vehemently to reject what Heath had 
achieved.  This segues logically into a useful description of the dramatic vote of 
October 1971 when the government was only able to secure passage of the European 
Communities Bill thanks to the votes of 69 Labour rebels led by Roy Jenkins, who 
defied Wilson’s three line whip, and supported British entry.  We also learn about 
reactions on the continent, where the unexpectedly problematic negotiations over the 
newly launched Common Fisheries Policy were not enough to dent a strong sense of 
satisfaction that after more than a decade the long-running dispute over British 
membership had at last been laid to rest.  Partly for this reason the new member states 
were invited to participate in several major internal discussions, including the 
December 1972 Paris Summit, even before they had officially taken their place within 
the Community.  The chapter does thus convey the extent to which Britain had joined 
an EEC full of ideas and ambition about advance, as well as Heath’s readiness fully to 
participate in these new ventures. But Wall’s own judgment of the negotiations’ 
outcome (pp.425-6) is highly guarded, noting the problems that were always likely to 
occur as a result of the budgetary settlement in particular, but tempering such 
criticism with the admission that this outcome was all but inevitable. 
 The final two chapters serve as a reminder of how life inside the European 
Community proved almost as difficult and frustrating as life outside had been.  Part of 
this was to do with timing. 1973 of course was not just the year when Britain took its 
place amongst the Nine.  It was also the year when the long postwar economic boom 
came to its end.  As a result, the new member states enjoyed no honeymoon period 
during which high growth rates helped ease the pain of any European readjustment, 
but instead found themselves and their new partners plunged rapidly into economic 
crisis.  Also hard-hit were some of the Community’s ambitious new plans, notably 
that for economic and monetary union.  The Werner Plan to realise EMU by 1980 was 
rapidly swept aside by the ongoing collapse of the world monetary system and the 
increasing volatility of European currencies against one another.  Nor were Europe’s 
foreign policy ambitions, to which Heath in particular had attached such hope, spared 
from this period of turmoil, suffering from first the botched American attempt to 
declare 1973 the Year of Europe and to readjust its approach to its Western partners, 
and then, by the year’s end, from the eruption of precisely the type of crisis in the 
Middle East that was best designed to reveal the cracks in any façade of European 
unity.  Twelve months on from the champagne and gala celebrations which had 
greeted Britain’s entry, much of the idealism with which some had regarded European 
membership looked distinctly tarnished. 
 Equally important though was the ever stronger vein of opposition to 
European membership apparent within the Labour party.  For by February 1974 Heath 
had fallen from power to be replaced by Harold Wilson, now at the helm of a party 
that had fought the election campaign on a pledge to renegotiate British EEC 
membership and to place the outcome before the British people, either by means of a 
general election, or by a referendum.  Britain’s hard won EEC membership looked in 
doubt after little over a year inside the Community.  Wilson, Wall makes clear, did 
not want to leave, nor did Jim Callaghan who had become Foreign Secretary.  But 
staying in required delicate manoeuvring both vis-à-vis the Labour party and vis-à-vis 
Britain’s European partners.  In the end the renegotiation changed relatively little 
since one of the main concessions secured from the Six, a mechanism designed to 
reduce the likelihood of Britain paying in substantially more to the Community 
budget than it was ever likely to receive back in the form of Community spending was 
hedged about with so many conditions that it never came into effect.  The benefits of 
the other main prize secured, an improvement in the terms given to New Zealand 
agricultural exporters, were little felt in the UK itself.  And such concessions had been 
won at a price in Brussels that put paid, in the short term at least, to any real hopes of 
British leadership of the integration process – although I would have welcomed a little 
more reflection on the part of Wall about the costs of renegotiation.  But Wilson had 
succeeded in manoeuvring himself and his government into a position where, in early 
1975, he could throw his authority and that of his principal ministers behind the ‘yes’ 
campaign in the referendum.  Some ministers did take the opposite line, as they were 
permitted to do under the highly unusual (although as this volume demonstrates not 
totally unprecedented) Cabinet ‘agreement to disagree’.  But the presence of most 
mainstream politicians from all three main parties on the ‘yes’ platform, together with 
the sight of a ‘no’ campaign prominently featuring Tony Benn, Ian Paisley and Enoch 
Powell is credited with helping to deliver the substantial 67% to 32% victory for those 
in favour of the UK remaining a member of the EEC.  The argument appeared over – 
except of course, as volume 3 of the Official History will doubtless go on to illustrate, 
it was not. 
 
So what can be learnt from the lengthy and eventful tale?  At one level, it is of course 
a striking demonstration of how much has changed in both Britain and the rest of 
Europe since the period covered by this volume.  The Community with which 
Macmillan, Wilson or Heath interacted was an incomparably smaller entity than the 
EU of today, whether measured in terms of its institutional system, its policy range, 
its economic weight or its membership.  The early EEC was already highly ambitious.  
Indeed it is remarkable how a Community whose activities in the 1960s and early 
1970s were essentially restricted to the running of a customs union and an expensive 
Common Agricultural Policy had already positioned itself in the minds of most 
Western European politicians, including those British leaders who aspired to join, as 
the central mechanism through which Europe as a whole could address and possibly 
reverse its relative decline in Global influence.  There were still many, moreover, who 
envisaged a near future when its structures would evolve along federal lines and 
become an out-and-out European government, although as Wall’s chapter on Britain’s 
first year in the Community helps remind us, such idealists were a largely frustrated if 
still vociferous minority within the EEC of the Seventies. But the Community’s actual 
powers and range of activity were still highly limited, making the drawing of parallels 
between then and now even more hazardous than usual. 
 Britain too was utterly different.  One noticeable contrast is the centrality of 
the Commonwealth to the British European debate in the 1960 and 1970s and the 
shared sense, amongst both Britain’s political elite and its public opinion, that 
securing a respectable deal for the former Dominions (and to a lesser extent other 
parts of the Commonwealth such as the sugar producers of the West Indies) was 
absolutely central to any European choice.  The manner in which both Heath in 1971 
and then Wilson in 1974 chose to accept a less favourable outcome on the issue of 
Britain’s budgetary contribution in return for a better package of measures designed to 
help New Zealand farmers seems almost incomprehensible from a contemporary 
perspective.  Equally striking is the all pervasive sense in British governing circles in 
the period covered that the decline of Britain’s power and standing was an 
inescapable reality, to be tempered or mitigated perhaps by such steps as joining 
‘Europe’ but fundamentally irreversible.  Viewed against this backdrop, the reaction 
against such ‘declinism’ in the early 1980s and beyond becomes that much more 
comprehensible – if not without pitfalls and problems of its own.  And also 
noteworthy is the way in which the British economic recovery aspired to by all of the 
governments discussed in this volume, was one build primarily on a revival of 
manufacturing and industry rather than finance and the service sector.  The voice of 
the City, so ubiquitous in contemporary debates about Britain and Europe, is notable 
by its absence in this volume. 
 Some important continuities remain, however.  One such is the British 
tendency to analyse European politics and seek to interact with the rest of Europe 
almost exclusively through the big powers.  There are times when reading this volume 
when Britain’s relationship with the Community appears to have been solely a tale of 
two cities, London and Paris, with neither Brussels nor any of the other member state 
capitals having any real part to play.  At other moments of the 1960s and 1970s a bit 
more importance was accorded to Germany, but little attention was ever paid to either 
the smaller powers or the Community institutions themselves.  Some of this big power 
bias remains in British European policy-making and policy interpretation of more 
recent times.  Also eerily familiar, and depressing, is the failure of successive British 
governments to build up a strong rapport with their German counterparts.  In chapter 
one Wall cites a British despatch from Bonn which urged the Macmillan government 
‘to demonstrate that we regard the Federal Republic as a trusted Ally, instead of a 
rather shady business partner to be tolerated but not liked’ (p.27).  There is little in the 
chapters that follow, however to suggest that this advice was every really taken to 
heart.  On the contrary, the Bonn-London relationship remained much more distant 
than it ought to have done despite the close identity of views on many issues, 
European and otherwise, between the two governments.  Britain therefore never 
gained the capacity to match either France or the US in influence on German policy, 
with UK ministers forced all too often to resort to ineffective bluster about troop 
withdrawals or other forms of bullying whenever they sought to alter Germany’s 
course.  The relatively good Heath-Brandt relationship, although less intense than that 
between Heath and Pompidou, remains a striking exception to an unfortunate general 
rule.   
 A final continuity, and one of some relevance for the current debate about 
Britain’s position vis-à-vis the EU, is the way in the Community/Union remains an 
entity in which flexibility towards insiders comes at the cost of a very reduced 
capacity to heed the needs and requests of outsiders.  Britain’s efforts to influence the 
Community’s direction from without during the course of the 1960s met with little 
success, despite the genuine goodwill towards London felt by many of the Six and the 
widespread belief that Britain would one day become a member of the club.  In the 
heat of bargaining around the Council table in Brussels, the voices that matter are 
those that are present, not those of countries looking on from the outside.  
Furthermore, the bargains once reached, tend to be all but impossible to unravel at the 
behest of third parties, however urgent their appeals or persuasive their pleas.  Once 
inside, by contrast, a Member State is much better placed to have their special 
interests met or their needs addressed.  The British renegotiation is a case in point, 
since neither legally nor morally, was the legitimacy of the UK request to revisit 
membership terms that had been agreed only two years earlier very great.  But the 
political need of the new British government to be able to show that it had kept its 
electoral pledge was acknowledged by the other member states, and not only was a 
dialogue able to begin, but a number of actual changes in the membership terms were 
agreed.  Translated into contemporary terms this means that Britain’s capacity to 
influence today’s much larger and more complex EU from the outside would be very 
limited indeed, with the inevitable outcome that multiple decisions would be taken in 
Brussels that affected Britain’s interests but over which London would have next to 
no say. Getting one’s way in an EU of 27 is never easy; getting one’s way, without 
being a member, would be all but impossible. 
 As the preceding pages demonstrate, there is plenty of interest and relevance 
in Stephen Wall’s volume.  With the successor volume in mind though, it is worth 
highlighting one or two features that were a little disappointing.  One such was the 
almost complete overlooking of the extensive secondary literature that already exists 
on both Britain’s relationship with the European Community, and with the 
development of European integration more generally.  The footnotes to this volume 
refer almost exclusively to primary documents, the sole exception being a handful of 
references to political memoirs.  This is has at least two negative effects.  First of all it 
makes it still harder for the reader to work out where to situate Wall’s account and 
interpretation against the multiple others that have preceded it.   And second it means 
that Wall’s assessments and judgments can never extend beyond the archival 
materials that he has been able to review.  As a result, his analysis of British policy 
towards, say, Germany depends wholly on what British diplomats at the time thought 
was happening in Bonn, rather than what we now know to have been the case through 
historical research.  Similarly, the importance of British domestic politics, or the state 
of the British economy on British European policy making, can only be spotted, using 
Wall’s approach, when the causal link is explicitly present in a primary document – 
something which is often not the case.  The rather muted role of Britain’s economic 
difficulties in this book’s account of Labour’s turn to Europe after 1966 may well be a 
case in point, since all of those participating in the Cabinet discussions of 1967 would 
have been so aware of the economic background that this scarcely needed to be 
spelled out, but remained of importance to the decision made.  Also slightly 
unfortunate is the decision not to divide any of the individual chapters, each of which 
is fairly lengthy, into any subsections.  This means for instance that an important 
episode like the Soames affair is buried in the latter part of a chapter the first portion 
of which contains comparatively little of interest, and which the reader might well 
choose to skip. 
 Overall though this is a useful addition to the existing literature on Britain and 
Europe.  Perhaps unsurprisingly given the near complete archival access to this period 
that historians have long enjoyed, there are few real surprises or revelations in this 
volume.  Nor is there the type of bold new interpretative thesis that Alan Milward 
sought to provide in volume one of the official history.  But such is the richness of the 
material, and the thoroughness of Wall’s account, that this is a book that will prove 
essential reading for anyone working on the troubled history of Britain’s attitude 
towards Europe.  And as this review has sought to illustrate there is also plenty here 
for those more interested in the present and the future, but still sensitive to the 
importance and relevance of contemporary history. 
  
 
 
 
